The perm utations o f sentence elements in B eckett's Watt have the impersonality (almost) o f mathematics. The variations o f com binations o f the same elements in certain sections o f the book could have been perform ed by a computer. It is noteworthy that J.M. Coetzee indeed subjects B eckett' s work to computer analysis, as i f he responds to aspects o f it by mirroring in his approach to it the essence o f its automatism/autism/insularity. C o etzee' s own insularity, though, takes its bearing prim arily fro m the socio-political state; B eckett's, i f linked to this, prim arily fro m the individual estranged by the contemporary world. B ut Beckett shares with Coetzee the informing thrift necessary f o r the establishment o f an aesthetics o f insularity.
Introduction
In an autobiographical sketch at the conclusion o f Doubling the point: Essays and interviews (1992), Coetzee (from what he terms the vantage point o f the "island" created by the dialogue with David Attwell, his interviewer, and from which he views him self symptomatically in the insulated third person)^ tells of his early work on Beckett: "He writes a formalistic analysis o f Beckett, concentrating on texts from a period in Beckett's life when Beckett too was 1 This article is a revised version of a paper originally delivered at the Intemational Association for the Study of Anglo-Irish Literature (lASAIL) conference, "Insulae, Islands, Ireland", hosted by the University of Sassari, Sardinia, 7-10 September 1994.
obsessed with form, with language as self-enclosed gam e" (Coetzee, 1992:393) . The context would have it that his work on Beckett is an extension o f his own "alienness". He feels "alien" at the University o f Texas, Austin, where he conducts his "formalistic analysis o f Beckett" -perhaps not a surprising fact concerning a young man in a foreign country -but he then traces (in his terms) "this feeling (o f alienness, not alienation) further back in time" . He tells o f his early years in South Africa, where the sense o f alienness is reinforced by the socio-political situation o f an A frikaner attending English-speaking schools.
He tells o f the stigmatisation this entails from his own people, who, in an adroitly engineered stratagem that culm inates in the Nationalist party victory o f 1948, are intent on m aintaining the purity o f the Afrikaner race. In Anatom y o f apartheid, H. Lindsay Smith (1979: 2) records the A frikaner's fierce desire "for his tribe to rem ain param ount and for his shelter to be found in tribal affinities. Thus ... he has come to feel that his duties lie not solely to the God that he worships, nor to the country in which he lives but to the sublimation o f self to the tribe" (Smith, 1979:2) . A type o f tribal separatism informs Coetzee's alienness, a type o f separatism (to anticipate a later thread in my discussion) also apparent in G rand Apartheid, where the effectiveness o f state control is dependent upon the sublimation o f self to the tribe. Intellectual "m iscegenation", as practised -however unwittingly -by the young Coetzee, underm ines the very basis o f separatist ideology, and, like sex across the colour bar, must be dealt with in severe terms. The biographical evidence, then, suggests a strong link between Coetzee's individual situation and the socio political situation in his country. But Coetzee is never overt in his fictional dealings with South African history. In fact, these dealings miglit, in their obliqueness, incorporate the following: "the W ittgensteinian account o f the relationship between fiction and historical discourse", as in Ricoeur's "narrative discourse" (which effectively links literature and history); "recent theories o f metafiction", as in Patricia W augh's and Linda Hutcheon's location of reflexivity w ithin politics, "the semiotics o f the later Prague School", as encoded in Mukarovsky's insistence that literature has access to the "total context o f social phenom ena"; as well as deconstruction, M arxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis (Attwell, 1990:96-106 
Coetzee and alienness
Coetzee's literary-historical perception o f his country is permeated by notions connected with insularity:
... the topos of the garden, the enclosed world entire to itself, is more extensive than the Judaeo-Christian myth of Eden. In its isolation from the great world, walled in by oceans and an unexplored northern wilderness, the colony of the Cape of Good Hope was indeed a kind of garden (Coetzee, 1988:3) .
W ithin the cultural ambience originally generated by this garden are two topographically bound types o f insularity:
One dream topography that the South African pastoral projects is ... of a network of boundaries crisscrossing the surface of the land, marking off thousands of farms, each a separate kingdom ruled over by a benign patriarch with, beneath him, a pyramid of contented and industrious children, grand children, and serfs. But there is a rival dream topography as well: of South Africa as a vast, empty, silent space, older than man, older than the dinosaurs whose bones lie bedded in its rocks, and destined to be vast, empty, and unchanged long after man has passed from its face. Under such a conception of Africa ... the task of the human imagination is to conceive not a social order capable of domesticating the landscape, but any kind of relation at all that consciousness can have with it (Coetzee, 1988:6-7) .
The "alienness" here is o f a transcendent, mythic dimension, the insularity o f a defining O ther which helps constitute tribal separatism, which, combined with the insularity o f the first order -farm, fort, island which appear in his workgives impetus to the mythic topologies so characteristic o f Coetzee's own version o f the pastoral.
The poetics of failure
Considering the above emphases on insularity and separateness in Coetzee's perception o f his historico-cultural inheritance, it is significant that one o f his essays on Beckett should contain in a prominent position this quotation from " Imagination Dead Imagine". " Islands, waters, azure, verdure, one glimpse and vanished, endlessly, omit" (in Coetzee, 1992:43 ). Coetzee comments:
The first four words, flagrantly composed though they may be, leading associatively one to the next via even the bathos of rhyme, threaten to assert themselves as illusion, as The Word in all its magical autonomy. They are erased ('omit') and left like dead leaves against a wall. The sentence thus embodies neatly two opposing impulses that permit a fiction of net zero: the impulse toward conjuration, the impulse toward silence. A compulsive self cancellation is the weight imposed on the flight of the sentence toward illusion; the fiction itself is the penance imposed on the pursuit of silence, rest, and death. Around the helix of ever-decreasing radius described by these conditions Beckett's art moves toward its apotheosis, the one-word text 'nothing' under the title 'Fiction'.
But if "islands" is the "illusion" it is also the "death", carrying in itself as an image the conditions o f silence, rest and, by extension, death. Beckett and Coetzee in their lives and fiction are island-dwellers, deeply fam iliar with the impulses o f silence and death, which are, at times, the prime objects o f their conjuration; certam ly both value immensely the inform ing thrift behind, for instance, the spare but richly packed death scene at the conclusion o f Coetzee's Age o f iron (1990:181), or the understated sense o f loss and relinquishm ent in the conjunction between the pain-racked Mr. Kelly and his free-flying kite at the end o f M urphy (1973:158) .
In em phasising Coetzee and Beckett's fascination with a product o f net zero, however, we must not lose sight o f Coetzee's affirmative capability. Coetzee's following words (concerning works by Nabokov, Barth and Beckett) help to isolate a linguistically bound, existential scepticism not really applicable to his own project:
The poetics of these works is a veritable poetics of failure, a program for constructing artifacts out of an endlessly regressive, etiolated selfconsciousness lost in the labyrinth of language and endlessly failing to erect itself into autonomy. The poetics of failure is ambivalent through and through, and part of its ambivalence is that it must parade its ambivalence; thus Beckett can speak of an art that is 'the expression that there is nothing to express' (Coetzee, 1992:87).4 .
The dialectic between form and history 1 think Coetzee longs at times for the anonymity o f zero, hence another reason for his attraction to Beckett, but som ething like a social responsibility forces an 3
In a dialogue with Georges Duthuit, Beckett observes: "I speak of an art turning from [the plane of the feasible] in disgust, weary of its puny exploits, weary of pretending to be able, of being able, of doing a little better the same old thing, of going a little further along a dreary road." To Duthuit's question, "And preferring what?", Beckett responds, "The expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express" (Kenner, 1973:30) .
almost traditionalist sense o f authorship on him. Despite his regard for formalism, he sees his work prim arily in relation to history, rather than the labyrinth o f language, to the point where he can conceive o f only two options for the novel, to supplement history, or be its rival (Attwell, 1990:101) . Never putting the notion o f autonomy to question, he chooses the latter, thereby embracing a difficult relationship in which historical immanence and transcendence both play a part. In the context o f postmodernism and the self reflexive work, this diachronic conscience might extract from him the following observation:
Anti-illusionism -displaying the tricks you are using instead of hiding them -is a common ploy of postmodernism. But in the end there is only so much mileage to be got out of the ploy. Anti-illusionism is, I suspect, only a marking of time, a phase of recuperation, in the history of the novel (Coetzee, 1992:27 ... even if [feminism] draws upon postmodern aesthetic forms of disruption, it cannot repudiate entirely the framework of Enlightened modernity without perhaps fatally undermining itself as an emancipatory politics. In proceeding through the demands of political practice, feminism must posit some belief in the notion of effective human agency (Waugh, 1992:195) .
Regarding the link between his attraction for a formalistic approach and the work o f Beckett, Coetzee (1992:23) him self admits: "Beckett's prose, which is highly rhetorical in its own way, lent itself to formal analysis" . Coetzee then makes an observation that sheds further light on the distinction between alienness and alienation: The raost meagre, the least plausible, would have satisfied Watt, who had not seen a symbol, nor executed an interpretation, since the age of fourteen, or fifteen, and who had hved, miserably it is true, among face values all his adult life ... (Beckett, 1970:70) .
But both types o f alienation result in the same psychological estrangement. Coetzee's alienness has a social dimension, relating to the invariable socio political nature o f the albeit mythical and elegantly epistemic (or formalised) frames he employs in his fiction. The dialectic between form and history in Coetzee is summarised by David Attwell as, "the difficult, seemingly intractable relationship in all Coetzee's novels between, on the one hand, system, structure, synchrony, acts o f apprehension or consciousness, and on the other, events, diachrony, and history" (Attwell, 1990:95) . This is not to deny a similar difficult relationship in Beckett, but Coetzee is justified, I think, in defining the voice in the later work o f Beckett as "post-mortem" (a formulation that might suggest an oblique play with the disembodied aspect o f the ^osi-modern voice).
Talking about delight
Far from simply being attracted by the austerity o f net zero, Coetzee gives " sensuous delight" as a principal reason for his studying Beckett:
Beckett's prose, up to and including The Unnameable, has given me a sensuous delight that hasn't dimmed over the years. The critical work 1 did on Beckett originated in that sensuous response, and was a grasping after ways in which to talk about it; to talk about delight (Coetzee, 1992:20 (Coetzee, 1992:393) . This capsule is not unlike the "little world" o f the padded cell, so admired by M urphy (Beckett, 1973:103) , or the world o f the supremely indifferent mental patients:
... the impression [Murphy] received was of that self-immersed indifference to the contingencies of the contingent world which he had chosen for himself as the only fehcity and achieved so seldom (Beckett, 1973:96) .
In analysing Beckett's Lessness (a work which in its second h alf repeats the words contained in the first half, but in a different order), Coetzee arrives at the conclusion:
This endless enterprise of splitting and recombining is language, and it offers not the promise of the charm, the ever-awaited magical combination that will bring wealth or salvation, but the solace of the game, the killing of time (Coetzee, 1992:21) , Is "solace" for Coetzee synonyinous with "sensuous delight"? W hatever our response to this question, the centripetal nature o f Beckett's ludism is surely sympathetic to the type o f self-encased reactions Coetzee has in mind. One of Beckett's games, o f course, turns on linguistic permutation. For example, Murphy calculates the total permutability o f the order in which six biscuits can be eaten; "edible in a hundred and twenty ways!" (Beckett, 1973:57) . This is a foretaste, so to speak, o f the permutations so intrinsic to the formalism o f Watt.
The permutations o f sentence elements in Watt have the impersonality (almost) o f mathematics. On page 27 o f Watt we find the first permutations based on "voices, singing, crying, stating, m urm uring" : "Now these voices, sometimes they sang only, and sometimes they cried only, and sometimes they stated only, and sometimes they murmured only, and sometimes they sang and cried, and sometimes they sang and stated, and sometimes they sang and m urm ured", and so on and so (predictably and intolerably) on. We enter here into W att's computer-like m ind, as impersonal as the electrical unit o f his name. The variations o f combinations o f the same elements in certain sections o f the book could have been performed by a computer, except for the fact that Beckett's hum our surfaces every now and again, such as in the conclusion to over a page o f variations on the combinations o f sock, stocking, boot, shoe or slipper Knott wore on his feet: "And sometimes he went barefoot" (1970:200-201) . We never find a responsive humour in Coetzee. More characteristically, Coetzee, indeed, subjects Beckett's work to computer analysis, as if his sensuous response to it can only be determined by the essence o f its auto m atism/autism/insularity. In this he seems to bring to completion Adorno and H orkheim er's conception o f the Enlightenm ent thinking process: "Thinking objectifies itself to become an automatic, self-activating process; an impersonation o f the machine that it produces itself so that ultimately the m achine can replace it" (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1986:25) . But if Coetzee's response to Beckett is what Beckett wryly had in m ind as the ideal conclusion to his project, Coetzee, again, emphasises the formalism o f the game rather than such self-undermining modernist irony. In his essay on Lessness Coetzee "ran a program which mapped repetitions occurring at different levels -the phrase, the sentence, and the paragraph" , and concluded with the previously quoted sentence:
This endless enterprise of splitting and recombining is language, and it offers not the promise of the charm, the ever-awaited magical combination that will bring wealth or salvation, but the solace of the game, the killing of time (Coetzee, 1992:21) .
In other words language offers an ideal o f formalistic ludism, apparent in Coetzee's own fiction in, to use Attw ell's terms, "the temporal reversals and structural parallelisms o f D usklands", "the numbered paragraphs and episodic repetitions o f In the heart o f the country", and "the crafted intertextuality of Foe" (Attwell, 1990:115) . In A ttw ell's view, the distancing o f authorial presence involved in such formalism "has the eíïect o f alluding to a source of non-authorial, cultural and by implication, historical conditioning" (Attwell, 1990:116) , as opposed to Coetzee's own synchronic interpretation o f Beckett's formahsm . For example, Attwell notes that Coetzee chooses to neglect the "circum stantial causes" behind "the deliberate and persistent evasion" o f the "obsessive state o f mind" as recorded in Watt (95). The book was written in the context o f Beckett's trying to keep one step ahead o f the Gestapo. Kenner (1973:22) indicates that Beckett left Paris "because o f the G erm ans", and "from pillar to post'" in the unoccupied zone com posed Watt.
Insularity
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word "insular" has four distinct m eaning clusters, which sort with the formalism o f Beckett's interm inable perm utations, Coetzee's program m atic responses to Beckett, and, indeed, Coetzee's own fiction: (Coetzee, 1986:22) . This absence o f a tongue is ftjndamentally linked with the linguistic contestation involved in tribal separatism and individuation (Smith, 1979:17) . Again, then, Coetzee's insularity reflects fairly obviously (though not in a simple way) on the socio political state, Beckett's insularity reflects primarily on "acts o f apprehension or consciousness" (cf. Attwell, 1990:95) . By rivalling history Coetzee demands an independence from it, but never to the extent where he can cancel it. A lth o u^ he desires to create "... a novel that operates in terms o f its own procedures and issues in its own conclusions, not one that operates in terms of the procedures o f history and eventuates in conclusions that are checkable by history (as a child's schoolwork is checked by a schoolmistress), ... inevitably, in our culture, history will, with varying degrees o f forcefulness, try to claim primacy, claim to be a master-form o f discourse ..." (Attwell, 1990:101-102 
Thrift
If insularity has an appropriate economy, it m ight be located in the word "thrift", which tells o f the prim e deployment o f limited resources, such as one would fmd on an island or in an isolated situation. Coetzee has an especial fondness for the notion o f "thrift", by means o f which, as already implied, we can also link him to Beckett, or at least certain o f Beckett's characters:
I do believe in spareness ... Spare prose and a spare, thrifty world: it's an unattractive part of my makeup that has exasperated people who have had to share their lives with me. On the other hand, I was reading George Bourne the other day, on rural England pre-1914. The key word for Bourne, a complex, value-laden word with a long history, is thrift: the culture of the western European peasantry was a culture of thrift. My family roots lie in that peasant culture, transplanted from Europe to Africa. So 1 am quite deeply ambivalent about disparaging thrift (Coetzee, 1992:20) .
Thriftiness is endemic in Beckett, but is perhaps nowhere better apparent than in his perm utations, based on the most m undane o f elements, such as different types o f biscuits, different sounds, different foot-wear. This is the thrifliness o f an ascetic material impoverishment, Beckett's aUemative to colluding with a rat-race for which he has no time. In other words, through this element of "thrift" we can ascribe socio-political resonances to both Coetzee and Beckett.
Beckett's high-modernism perceives thrifi as culm inating in a product o f net zero, but cannot efface its social dimension. Coetzee is very concerned with its social dimension. But in the end we m ust concede, with a cautionary Beckettian regard for a too simplistic dichotomising, that for Beckett thrifl above all informs his relation with a desired nothingness, while for Coetzee it informs his relation, through writing, with the plenum o f lived experience. In this way, in Coetzee the spare, bleak insularity o f the apartheid state inspires a now consciously chosen isolationism both symptomatic and interrogative o f its context, while in Beckett the more general alienation o f the modernist world at large posits a remoteness that sees as pointless the need for such interrogation.
